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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ROYDEN V. CARTER,

i

Plaintiff/Appellee,
:

vs.

Case No. 930554-CA

SHIRLEY HANRATH and MAGDALENE .
STEVENS,
Defendants/Appellants.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE ROYDEN V. CARTER
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to the
provisions of Article VIII of the Utah Constitution; Utah Code
Annotated §78-22-3(2)(k), 1953 as amended; and Rule 3 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure,
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court was correct in finding that the

disputed parcel was encompassed by visible boundary lines marked by
valid monuments and fence lines,
2.

Whether the trial court was correct in concluding as a

matter of law that a boundary by acquiescence was established by
the parties and their predecessors.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for all issues of law presented on
appeal herein is one of assessment for correctness.
Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1342 (Utah, 1990).

State v. Rio

The standard of

review where the trial court's factual findings are challenged is
the clearly erroneous standard.

Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure; Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah, 1991).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
ORDINANCES AND RULES
None.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee adopts and incorporates by reference herein the
Statement of the Case as set forth in Appellant's Brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The brevity of the facts set forth in Defendant's Brief
necessitates further amplification.
The property in dispute is located along the banks of the
Duchesne River approximately 18 miles north and west of Duchesne,
Utah (TR. 80, 116). It is bordered on the south by the north line
of Section 20, Township 2 South, Range 6 West, Uintah Special Base
and Meridian,and on the north by ledges and cliffs (TR. 12). The
distance between the said section line and the ledges and cliffs is
approximately 7 00 feet. The Duchesne River, which varies in width
from 250 feet to 200 yards, bisects the property from west to east
in an area south and adjacent or in close proximity to said ledges
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and cliffs (TR. 3 5 , 7 2 , 8 4 , 141, 201 and 2 0 2 ) .
1964,

the

Plaintiff

and

hi:

negot:,;.;.-ad a pin chase of proper ty f

brother,
•••

+

:arter,

*

" '.- ana] p ,

et.ux, who had been the owner of said property for :. . 0 . 1 thirty
years prior thereto (TR. 66 and 1 4 2 ) .
0

;' - •

*

Thereafter i

*<

•

y

i n May, 1969,
"

(TR , 37, 38

*' the time ^1 purchaser, rlaintii f inspected the

and :
property

purchased

rectanquiai
highway

from

Abplanalp

and

found

the

same

to

be

111 i;!iapo with «i fronhiqe nn I \\(-\ 1101 1 h • -. i ci <r* nt a state

enclosed

by

fence

running

parallel

thereto

and

old

established fence lines which extended north along the East and
West boi 11 ldari es : >f sai d tract to tl le ] edges and c] :i ffs ] ocated c i: 1
the north side of the Duchesne River (TR. 73, 75, 85, 86, 1 40 am i
141) (EX. 1 2 ) .
Inspect:] 01 1 and 2 nvestigati 01 1 fi irti ie:i : revealed that tl le sai d
Abplanalp had acguired the property many years ago from his wife's
family who had been long time residents and owners of said property
(

Investigation further revealed that the land enclosed within
the

fences

and cliffs

above

described

had historical" . jjeen

occupied ai id 1 isecl as a single c] a i med ownershi p for agr icul T P and
stock raising; that many years ago a barn and stack yard had been
constructed ^nn existed along the south side of the Duchesne River
•;}:•...
continued in use (TR. 29, 33,

thp disputed area which has
;.

, 120-125, 1 2 7 , 130 and 1 4 2 ) .
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After purchase by the Plaintiff, the property continued to be
occupied and used for agriculture and stock raising (TR. 39, 130,
143 and 144).

The fence lines which formed the east and west

boundaries of the property were anchored into the ledges and said
ledges formed a natural boundary and barrier (TR. 134, 145-147).
Livestock relied upon access to the river as the source of water
(TR. 67, 144).
Approximately 55 acres of the property acquired by Carter
extended north to the Duchesne River and was devoted to the raising
of alfalfa with the remainder used as irrigated pasture and "cowcalf" operation (TR.93-95, 130, 144).
Plaintiff did not know of the true location of the north line
of Section 2 0 aforesaid, and has never had the property surveyed
(TR. 74, 75 and 152), and always assumed the boundary of the
property to be within the confines of the fences and ledges
aforesaid (TR. 64).
The

predecessors

in

interest

of

the Defendant

Hanrath,

acquired a deed to property described as the Southeast quarter of
Section 17, Township 2 South, Range 6 West, Uintah Special Base and
Meridian in 1961 (TR. 162, 163)(Exs. 17 and 20).

The total tract

was 160 acres and at least 80% was located in a plateau above the
Duchesne River with approximately 20% located in the ledges and
area of the Duchesne River.

Access to the major portion of the

property (80%) was on top of the plateau located above the Duchesne
River and the remainder of the property located in and below the
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ledges w a s landlocked (TR. 1 0 6 ) .
The said predecessors in interest inspected

:.• p r o p e r t y

t »no

".' si«in i n l T / 4 MI I O /S i T N

I I.O I . -iM I • "

land

.. dispute w a s landlocked, had no access i nc ~iiat livestock

w a s being pastured in the area (TR. 1 6 8 , 1 9 1 ) .
The D e f e n d a n t s , Ha nratl I and s tev e n s , acqi :i i red a deed to tl le
Southeast quarter of Section 17 aforesaid,

A u g u s t of 1986 (TR.

2 8 8 ) . (Ex. 2 5 ) . A t t h e time of purchase i:-y caid D e f e n d a n t s , they
w e r e awai -e < :)f t h e existence of the o] d establ ished fence ] I nes ai id
that

Plaintiff

Carter

and his predecessors

in

interest h a d

exclusively occupied, improved, developed and claimed ownership of
••*.

:

.;•:'.• •: ::o i ancient fence lines a n d

t h e ledges a n d cliffs (TR. 43-54, :;•:()-* :: \{V:x:'r

• I-i i n c l u s i v e ) .

N e i g h b o r s in t h e area have similarly reco-: / z e d th

"i : :] 3 f fs 1 \ ' II H ! i K >i 1 1 I of t i le Duchesne River a s constituting a natural
boundary (R. 2 4 ^ , 2 5 2 - 2 5 3 ) .
* w a s n o t until t h e Defendants cau.
L.98f

hat a

d

, ancy

between

t h e survey

;:,e wiiu

•. .

established boundaries w a s asserted for t h e first time (TR. 3 9 ,
2 4 7 f 2 50),

At nc time prior thereto had any di spute exi sted v

challMjqed t lit* oh

. ence lines and 1 edges as being the boundary v.-,"

the property (TR. 3 8, 13 0 , 15 7) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case turns on whether t h e occupation of the disputed
p a r c e l b y Appellee and h i s predecessors in interest satisfy t h e
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requirements contained in Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah,
1990) to establish a boundary by acquiescence.

Of the four

elements contained in Staker, the first two are the only ones at
issue, to-wit:
1.

Occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments,

fences or buildings;
2.

Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary.

Appellee contends that the evidence clearly established that
the disputed parcel was encompassed by clearly visible fence lines
and definite monuments in the form of ledges and cliffs which were
used and recognized as one portion of the boundary.

Further, said

ledges and cliffs constitute a natural monument for the purpose of
establishing a boundary.
With respect to the element of acquiescence, there is no
requirement that there be either express or implied intent by the
parties establishing the boundary.

Rather, acquiescence may be

established by indolence or consent by silence. Such indolence and
silence were present here establishing acquiescence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
OCCUPATION OF DISPUTED PARCEL IS BOUNDED BY
VISIBLE FENCE LINES AND MONUMENTS
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has
accepted

by

jurisdictions.

the

courts

of

this

state

as

well

long been
as

other

The most recent pronouncement of this doctrine by
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the

Utah

Supreme

Court

together

with

t h e elements

which a r e

required a r e stated in t h e case of Staker v . Ainsworth, 785 P.2d
417 (Utah, 1 9 9 0 ) -

Those elements are:

].

Occupation u p to a visible line marked ^v
m o n u m e n t s , fences, or b u i l d i n g s ;

?

Mutual acquiescence in the line a s a boundary;
For a long period of time; a n d

4.

tsy a-;

.^ •:

r-^nw\oi

r;.

See also: Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629 P. 2d 447, 448 (Utah,
1981)•
As stated in the Hanrath's brief, there is no dispute that the
third and fourth elements have been met in this case.
they

have

raised

p r o p e r t y is up

m i .ippivil

n, whrthi'i

The issue

t lie u c c u p a t x o n

ul t h e

.. visible line marked b y m o n u m e n t s , fences or

b u i l d i n g s a n d whether there h a s been acquiescence in the d i s p u t e d
1 i ne a s t h e boi indary be tweei i t h e adjoi n i i lg parcels .
W i t h respect t o the first issue, the record cleai.y

indicates

and t h e evidence established that t h e occupation OJ. '

si ibject

p r op e r ty

b^ r

Ca r ter

and

m o n u m e n t s a n d fence lines.

1) i s

p r edecessors

existed

definite

The testimony and evidence established

that the fence lines had been used and acknowledged as *
west boundaries <>t: the subject property for a peri cc

.: ui .cQi

fifty y e a r s .
W i t h respect to t h e northern boundary, t h e ledger, find

iitt

clearly constitute a monument for the purposes of establishing that
boundary.

In Carr v. Schombera,

232 P.2d 597 (Cal. 1 9 5 1 ) , t h e
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California Supreme Court was faced with a similar issue now before
this Court

in deciding

whether

a

"tree line" constituted

a

sufficient monument for the purposes of establishing a boundary
between two adjoining parcels.

The Court held that "while the

actual erection of a fence or like monument along an agreed
boundary would have great weight in the fixing of such a boundary
such means are not exclusive," The Court then went on to hold that
the "tree line" constituted a sufficient monument for establishing
a boundary. Also, it has been held that a "ledgey shore and creek"
are natural monuments for the purposes of fixing boundaries.
Burnham v. Hoit, 104 N.E. 62 (Mass.).

Also, "permanent objects,

such as streams, or rivers, and the shore of a lake, or highways,
or other lands, or buildings, or stakes when referred to in the
description

of property

conveyed, are known as 'monuments111.

Temple v. Benson, 100 N.E. 63 (Mass.).
Accordingly, there is no basis for contending

that the

northern boundary of the subject property which abuts the ledges
and cliffs is not clearly established by "monuments". Therefore,
Carter contends and submits that the first element to establish
boundary by acquiescence has been met.
POINT II.
ACQUIESCENCE MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY INDOLENCE
AND SILENCE OF PARTIES
With respect to the issue of acquiescence, there is no
requirement that the parties enter into an express agreement which
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establishes the boundary.

In Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 530

P.2d 7 92, 7 94 (Utah, 1975) the Utah Supreme Court held that:
It should be clearly understood that our case
law does not support, and that we do not agree
with the proposition that a landowner can
claim boundary solely on the basis of an oral
agreement. From a reading of the cases, it
will be seen that it requires the acceptance,
or the giving of consent or approval, by words
or conduct, over some substantial period of
time and when certain requisites are met.
instant case, the record clearly shows that the
dispi

•

:.:*••

•••

i-:quiesced In .tod acknowledged i n the

community for a period of at least fifty years prior to the
initiation of this action. The subject parcel v property was used
up lo the I once J J lies and 1 bo J edges ..;_;•-: .:::.. ; or that period
time for livestock and other agricultural purposes,

\s stated in

Hobson, the acceptance of the boundaries need not be

•*<

^s

simply by way of conduct between the parties. The
predecessors of both the Hanraths and Carter, by their conduct,
established the boundaries and the use ol" f:he property extended ID
those boi indaries for < i substantial period of time necessary to
establish boundary by acquiescence.
their brief, the Hanraths are urging this Court t;o adopl.
"objed .i ve" or "subjective" tests in determining whether
there was uncertainty or dispute as to whether there was boundary
by acquiescence. However, the Utah ilupreme Court in Staker, supra,
expressly overruled this additional fifth requirement which was set
forth in the case of Halladav v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah, 1984)
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and the line of cases which followed Halladav which adopted the
requirement of this fifth element.

In Staker, the Utah Supreme

Court stated that the Halladay decision together with the other
decisions following that precedent caused a great deal of confusion
and controversy among judges, lawyers and landowners in this state.
Staker at 422.

This confusion arose from the Court's use of the

doctrines "boundary by acquiescence" and "boundary by agreement" as
being practically interchangeable.

In Staker, the Utah Supreme

Court sought to remedy the confusion caused by the requirement that
there be an agreement using either an objective or subjective
standard and reiterated and reestablished the four basic and
fundamental

elements

listed

above

to

establish

boundary

by

acquiescence.
The Staker opinion follows earlier decisions of our Supreme
Court which do not require any showing of either express or implied
"intent" that the parties use a disputed boundary in order to
establish "boundary by acquiescence."

In Lane v. Walker, 505 P.2d

1199, 1200 (Utah, 1973), the Court held that:
[T]he test to establish the boundary by
"acquiescence" necessarily need not be based
on mutual
"intent."
"Intent" is not
synonymous with "acquiescence" in these cases.
"Acquiescence" is more nearly synonymous with
"indolence" or "consent by silence",- or a
knowledge that a fence or other monuments
appears to be a boundary, - but that no one
did anything about it for 48 years. (Emphasis
added).
In this case Carter and his predecessors used the parcel
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within the disputed boundaries for at least 50 years and "no one
did anything about it" until this action was commenced. Fences and
structures were erected and used on the disputed parcel by Carter
and his predecessors for at least 50 years and neither the Shraders
nor their predecessors protested.

Their "consent by silence" or

"indolence" for such a long period of time is more than sufficient
to establish the element of "acquiescence."
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellee submits that all of the
elements to establish a boundary by acquiescence have been met and
satisfied in this case.

The property in question is bounded by

clearly visible fence lines and natural monuments which have been
used and recognized as the boundary for many years. The use of the
property up to those boundaries has been acquiesced to by the
Appellants and their predecessors for a sufficient period of time
to establish a boundary by acquiescence.
Accordingly, Appellee respectfully requests that the trial
court's judgment be affirmed.
RespectffuTTy Submitted,

CORY R./ WALL
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that 2 true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee was hand delivered, postage prepaid to
Frederick N. Green and Julie V. Lund, GREEN & BERRY, 10 Exchange
Place, 622 Newhouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this
day of November, 1993.
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CbRY R. WALL
Attorney i: or Plaintiff/Appellee

